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Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 38-59

Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy

Author keywords

Stochastic emissions; Team incentive scheme; UK Climate Change Agreements

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENTS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; HIGH PROBABILITY; INCENTIVE SCHEMES;

EID: 84872782843     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.09.001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (10)

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