Abatement and permits when pollution is uncertain and violations are fined

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 299-312

  Wirl, Franz ^a   Noll, Juergen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Fines; Incomplete compliance; Permit markets; Permits and abatement; Stochastic pollution

Indexed keywords

RANDOM PROCESSES; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; STANDARDS;

INCOMPLETE COMPLIANCE; PERMIT MARKETS; STOCHASTIC POLLUTION;

AIR POLLUTION;

ABATEMENT COST; COMPARATIVE STUDY; POLLUTION TAX; STOCHASTICITY;

EID: 43849086475     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9154-z     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Beavis B and Dobbs I (1987). Firm behavior under regulatory control of stochastic environmental wastes by probabilistic constraints. J Environ Econ Manage 14: 112-127
2. Beavis B and Walker M (1983). Achieving environmental standards with stochastic discharges. J Environ Econ Manage 10: 103-111
3. Brennan G and Buchanan JM (1980). The power to tax: analytical foundations of a Fiscal constitution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
4. EC (2003) Directive 2003/87/EC
5. Horan RD (2001). Cost-effective and stochastic dominance approaches to stochastic pollution control. Environ Resour Econ 18: 373-389
6. Innes R (2003). Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions and optimality of emission permit banking. J Environ Econ Manage 45: 546-568
7. Liski M (2001). Thin versus thick CO2 market. J Environ Econ Manage 41: 295-311
8. Maeda A (2003). The emergence of market power in emission rights markets: the role of initial permit distribution. J Regul Econ 24: 293-314
9. Malik AS (1990). Markets for pollution when firms are noncompliant. J Environ Econ Manage 18: 97-106
10. Malik AS (2002). Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating. J Environ Econ Manage 44: 371-390
11. Montero J-P (1999). Voluntary compliance with market-based environmental policy: evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program. J Politi Econ 107: 998-1033
12. Nyborg K and Telle K (2006). Firms' compliance to environmental regulation: is there really a paradox? Environ Resou Econ 35: 1-18
13. Schmalensee R, Joskow PL, Ellerman AD, Montero JP and Bailey EE (1998). An interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading. J Econ Perspect 12(3): 53-68
14. 2 allowance trading. J Econ Perspect 12(3): 69-88
15. Stranlund JK (2004) Optimal noncompliance in emission trading programs. University of Mass. Amherst, Department of Economics, Working Paper 2004-4
16. Stranlund JK, Costello C and Chavez CA (2005). Enforcing emissions trading when emissions permits are bankable. J Regulat Econ 28: 181-204
17. Stranlund JK and Dhanda KK (1999). Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system. J Environ Econ Manage 28: 181-204
18. The Economist (2006), Cleaning up. Power companies and shorting traders have done better than the environment, May 6th 2006, p79.
19. van Egteren H and Weber M (1996). Marketable permits, market power and cheating. J Environ Econ Manage 30: 161-173
20. Wirl F, Huber C and Walker IO (1998). Joint implementation: strategic reactions and possible remedies. Environ Resour Econ 12: 203-224
21. Zhao J (2003). Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable emission permits and emission charges. J Public Econ 87: 2765-2789