The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 71-92

  Franckx, Laurent ^a,b  

^a ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Ambient inspections; Commitment; Environmental enforcement

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; POLLUTION MONITORING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036361637     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1167     Document Type: Article

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