Mind the gap? Description, experience, and the continuum of uncertainty in risky choice

Progress in Brain Research

Volumn 202, Issue , 2013, Pages 55-71

  Camilleri, Adrian R ^a   Newell, Ben R ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Description experience gap; Exemplar model; Probability; Recency; Sampling bias; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BRAIN FUNCTION; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; DESCRIPTION EXPERIENCE GAP; FEEDBACK SYSTEM; HUMAN; INFORMATION SEEKING; INFORMATION STORAGE; LEARNING; MEMORY; PERSONAL EXPERIENCE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK; SELF EVALUATION; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 84872382919     PISSN: 00796123     EISSN: 18757855     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62604-2.00004-6     Document Type: Chapter

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