Resolving contradictions

The Shape of Reason: Essays in Honour of Paolo Legrenzi

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 91-105

  Byrne, Ruth M J ^a   Walsh, Clare A ^b  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871383088     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203338186     Document Type: Chapter

References (28)

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