Reasoning Counterfactually: Making Inferences about Things That Didn't Happen

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition

Volumn 28, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 1154-1170

  Thompson, Valerie A ^a,b   Byrne, Ruth M J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; ATTENTION; CONCEPT FORMATION; FEMALE; HUMAN; LINGUISTICS; LOGIC; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PROBLEM SOLVING; READING; SEMANTICS;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ATTENTION; CONCEPT FORMATION; FEMALE; HUMANS; LOGIC; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLINGUISTICS; READING; SEMANTICS;

EID: 85047671062     PISSN: 02787393     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.28.6.1154     Document Type: Article

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