Heterogeneity playing key role: Modeling and analyzing the dynamics of incentive mechanisms in autonomous networks

ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2012, Pages

  Wang, Yufeng ^a,b   Nakao, Akihiro ^c   Vasilakos, Athanasios V ^d  

^a BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (China)

^b NANJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN MACEDONIA   (Greece)

Author keywords

Autonomous networks and systems; Heterogeneity; Incentive mechanisms

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS NETWORKS; CO-EVOLUTION; DYNAMIC LINKING; EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; HETEROGENEITY; HETEROGENEOUS CHARACTERISTIC; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; NETWORK STRUCTURES; PAIRWISE INTERACTION; PRISONER'S DILEMMA; SMALL WORLDS; STATIC EQUILIBRIUM; STRUCTURED NETWORKS;

GAME THEORY; PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS; TOPOLOGY;

DYNAMICS;

EID: 84870165287     PISSN: 15564665     EISSN: 15564703     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/2348832.2348834     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. ADAR, E. AND HUBERMAN, B. 2000. Free riding on Gnutella. First Monday Online J.
2. BU, T. AND TOWSLEY, D. 2002. On Distinguishing between Internet Power Law Topology Generators. In Proceedings of the Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (InfoCom).
3. BURAGOHAIN, C., AGRAWAL D., AND SURI, S. 2003. A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P).
4. CLARK, D. D., WROCLAWSKI, J., SOLLINS, K. R., AND BRADEN, R. 2005. Tussle in cyberspace: Defining tomorrow's Internet. IEEE/ACM Trans. Network. 13, 3.
5. COHEN, B. 2003. Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems.
6. COURCOUBETIS, C. AND WEBER, R. 2006. Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Comm. 24, 5.
7. FEHR, E. AND GACHTER, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415.
8. FRIEDMAN, D. 1998. On economic applications of evolutionary game theory. J. Evolutionary Econ. 8, 1.
9. GACHTER, S., RENNER, E., AND SEFTON, M. 2008. The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322.
10. GURERK, O., IRLENBUSH, B., AND ROCKENBACH, B. 2006. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312.
11. HAUERT, C., TRAULSEN, A., BRANDT, H., MARTIN A., NOWAK, M. A., AND SIGMUND, K. 2007. Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science 316, 5833.
12. HOFFMAN, K., ZAGE, D., AND NITA-ROTARU, C. 2007. A survey of attack and defense techniques for reputation systems. ACM Comput. Surv. 42, 1.
13. HUGHES, D., COULSON G., AND WALKERDINE, J. 2005. Free riding on Gnutella revisited: The bell tolls? IEEE Distrib. Syst. Online 6, 6.
14. LATORA, V. AND MARCHIORI, M. 2003. Economic small-world behavior in weighted networks. Europe. Phys. J. B, 32.
15. NEWMAN, M. E. J. 2003. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM Rev. 45, 167-256.
16. NIMWEGEN, E. V., CRUTCHFIELD, J. P., AND MITCHELL, M. 1997. Finite populations induce metastability in evolutionary search. Phys. Lett. A, 229.
17. NISAN, N., ROUGHGARDEN, T., TARDOS, E., AND VAZIRANI, V. V. 2007. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.
18. PACHECO, J. M., TRAULSEN, A., AND NOWAK, M. A. 2006. Active linking in evolutionary games. J Theor. Biol. 243.
19. ROCA, C. P., CUESTA, J. A., AND SÁNCHEZ, A. 2009. Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics. Phys. Life Rev. 6, 4 208-249.
20. TRAULSEN, A., NOWAK, M. A., AND PACHECO, J. M. 2006. Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E, 74.
21. TRAULSEN, A., HAUERT, C., BRANDT, H., SILVA, D., NOWAK, M. A., AND SIGMUND, K. 2009. Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106.
22. VASSILAKIS, D. K. AND VASSALOS, V. 2009. An analysis of peer-to-peer networks with altruistic peers. Elsevier Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 2, 2.
23. VASSILEVA, J. AND SUN, L. 2007. Using community visualization to stimulate participation in online communities. e-Service J. 6, 1.
24. WANG, Y. F. AND NAKAO, A. 2010. On cooperative and efficient overlay network evolution based on group selection pattern. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man. Cybern. B Cybern. 40, 3.
25. WANG, Y. F., NAKAO, A., VASILAKOS A. V., AND MA, J. H. 2011a. P2P soft security: On evolutionary dynamics of P2P incentive mechanism. Elsevier Comput. Comm. 34, 3.
26. WANG, Y. F., NAKAO, A., AND MA, J. H. 2010. A simple public-goods game based incentive mechanism for resource provision in P2P networks. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing (UIC). Springer, LNCS 6406.
27. WANG, Y. F., NAKAO, A., AND VASILAKOS, A. V. 2011b. On modeling of coevolution of strategies and structure in autonomous overlay networks. ACM Trans. Autonom. Adapt. Syst. 7, 2.
28. WATTS, D. J. AND STROGATZ, S. H. 1998. Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks. Nature 393.
29. ZHAO, Q., LUI, C. S., AND CHIU, D. M. 2009. Analysis of adaptive incentive protocols for P2P networks In Proceedings of the Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies (InfoCom).