Fair, optimal or detrimental? Environmental vs. strategic use of border carbon adjustment

Energy Economics

Volumn 34, Issue SUPPL.2, 2012, Pages

  Weitzel, Matthias ^a   Hübler, Michael ^b   Peterson, Sonja ^a  

^a KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY   (Germany)

^b CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC RESEARCH ZEW   (Germany)

Author keywords

Border tax adjustment; Climate policy; Coalitions; General equilibrium model; Leakage; Trade diversion

Indexed keywords

BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS; CARBON EMISSIONS; CARBON LEAKAGE; CARBON PRICE; CARBON-BASED; CLIMATE POLICY; COALITIONS; COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; EQUALISATION; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS; LOW INCOME COUNTRIES; MARGINAL EFFECTS; STANDARD RATES; TAX RATES;

CLIMATE MODELS; COMMERCE; LEAKAGE (FLUID); TAXATION;

CARBON;

CARBON EMISSION; COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EMISSION CONTROL; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL TAX; EXPORT; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

CHINA; INDIA;

EID: 84870056709     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.023     Document Type: Article

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