Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory

Synthese

Volumn 189, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 515-534

  Spaulding, Shannon ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Folk psychology; Mindreading; Mirror neurons; Simulation Theory; Theory Theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868447709     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0086-y     Document Type: Article

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