Social systems

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 557-578

  Maibom, Heidi L ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Folk psychology; Philosophy of mind; Social knowledge; Theoretical models; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 34648843366     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981     Document Type: Article

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