Generalizing and modifying the Hoede-Bakker index

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4342 LNAI, Issue , 2006, Pages 60-88

  Rusinowska, Agnieszka ^a,b   De Swart, Harrie ^c  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

^c TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Hoede Bakker index; Inclination vector; The Coleman indices; The K nig Br uninger index; The Penrose measure; The Rae index

Indexed keywords

COLEMAN; GROUP DECISION; HOEDE-BAKKER INDEX; POWER INDICES; PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES; THE PENROSE MEASURE; THE RAE INDEX;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 84867754540     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11964810_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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