Paradoxes of voting power in Dutch politics

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 109-137

  Van Deemen, Adrian ^a   Rusinowska, Agnieszka ^b,c  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Poland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037239510     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022827428428     Document Type: Review

References (26)

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