Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 171-197

  Laruelle, Annick ^a   Valenciano, Federico ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17444411150     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0298-7     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Banzhaf J (1965) Weighted voting doesn't work: A Mathematical Analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19: 317-343
2. Barry B (1980) Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part I and Part II. Polit Stud 28: 183-194, 338-352
3. Braham M, Steffen F (2002) Local monotoncity of voting power: A conceptual analysis. Mimeo
4. Brams SJ, Lake M (1978) Power and satisfaction in a representative democracy. In: Game theory and political science. NYU Press, pp 529-562
5. Calvo E, Lasaga JJ (1997) Probabilistic graphs and power indices: an application to the Spanish Parliament. J Theoret Polit 9: 477-501
6. Calvo E, Santos JC (2000) Weighted weak semivalues. Int J Game Theory 29: 1-9
7. Carreras F, Freixas J, Puente MA (2002) Semivalues as power indices, Research Report MA2-IR-01-00010, Polytechnic University of Catalonia. Eur J Oper Res (forthcoming)
8. Carreras F, Magaña A (1994) The multilinear extension and the modified Banzhaf-Coleman index. Math Soc Sci 28: 215-222
9. Coleman JS (1971) Control of collectivities and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman B (ed) Social choice. Gordon and Breach, London
10. Coleman JS (1986) Individual interests and collective action: Selected essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
11. Deegan J, Packel EW (1978) A new index of power for simple n-person games. Int J Game Theory 7: 113-123
12. Dubey P (1975) On the uniqueness of the shapley value. Int J Game Theory 4: 131-139
13. Dubey P, Neyman A, Weber RJ (1981) Value theory without efficiency. Math Oper Res 6: 122-128
14. Dubey P, Shapley LS (1979) Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. Math Oper Res 4: 99-131
15. Einy E (1987) Semivalues of simple games. Math Oper Res 12: 185-192
16. Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1998) The measurement of voting power: Theory and practice, problems and paradoxes. Edward Elgar Publishers, London
17. Freixas J, Zwicker W (2003) Weighted voting, abstention and multiple levels of approval. Soc Choice Welfare 21(3): 399-431
18. Galloway D (2001) The treaty of nice and beyond. Realities and illusions of power in the EU. Sheffield Academis Press, Sheffield, England
19. Garrett G, Tsebelis G (1999) Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the european union? J Theoret Polit 11: 291-308
20. Hart S, Mas Colell A (1989) Potential, value and consistency. Econometrica 57: 589-614
21. Holler RJ (ed.) (1982) Power, voting, and voting power. Physica, Heidelberg
22. Holler MJ, Fackel EW (1983) Power, luck and the right index. J Econ 43: 21-29
23. Johnston RJ (1978) On the measurement of power: some reactions to laver. Environ Planning A 10: 907-914
24. König T, Bräuninger T (1998) The inclusiveness of European decision rules. J Theoret Polit 10: 125-142
25. Lamelle A (1998) Game theoretical analysis of decision-making processes with applications to the European Union. Ph. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Université catholique de Louvain, éditions Ciaco, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
26. Lamelle A, Valenciano F (2001) Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices revisited. Math Oper Res 26: 89-104
27. Laruelle A, Valenciano F (2002a) Power indices and the veil of ignorance. Int J Game Theory 31: 331-339
28. Laruelle A, Valenciano F (2002b) Potential, value and probability. Discussion Paper 27/2002. Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV, Basque Country University, Bilbao, Spain
29. Laruelle A, Valenciano F (2002e) Potential, and 'power of a collectivity to act'. Discussion Paper 29/2002. Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV, Basque Country University, Bilbao, Spain
30. Laruelle A, Valenciano F (2003a) Semivalues and voting power. Int Game Theory Rev 5: 41-61
31. Laruelle A, Valenciano F (2003b) On the meaning of Owen-Banzhaf coalitional value. In: Gambarelli G (ed) Essays in Cooperative games in honor of Guillermo Owen (Theory and Decision Library C, vol. 36) (forthcoming)
32. Napel S, Widgrén M (2004) Power measurement as sensitivity analysis - A unified approach. J Theoret Polit 16(4): 517-538
33. Niemi RG, Weisberg HF (eds) (1972) Probability models of collective decision making. Columbus, Ohio, Merrill Publishing
34. Owen G (1975) Multilinear extensions and the Banzhaf value. Nav Res Log Q 22: 741-750
35. Owen G (1977) Values of games with a priori unions. In: Hein R, Moeschlin O (eds) Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, New York Berlin Heidelberg, pp, 76-88
36. Owen G (1982) Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with a priori unions. In: Holler 1982, pp 232-238
37. Owen G (1988) Multilinear extensions. In: Roth 1988, pp 139-151
38. Penrose LS (1946) The elementary statistics of majority voting. J Royal Statist Soc 109: 53-57
39. Rae D (1969) Decision rules and individual values in constitutional choice. Am Polit Sci Rev 63: 40-56
40. Roth AE (ed) (1988) The Shapley Value. Essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
41. Shapley LS, Shubik M (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Am Polit Sci Rev 48: 787-792 (Also in Roth 1988, pp 41-48.)
42. Shapley LS, Shubik M (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Am Polit Sci Rev 48: 787-792 (Also in Roth 1988, pp 41-48.)
43. Straffin PD (1977) Homogeneity, independence and power indices. Publ Choice 30: 107-118
44. Straffin PD (1982) Power indices in politics. In: Brams SJ, Lucas WF, Straffin PD (eds) Political and related models. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York, pp 256-321
45. Straffin PD (1988) The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities. In: Roth 1988, pp 71-81
46. Straffin PD, Davis MD, Brams SJ (1981) Power and satisfaction in an ideologically divided voting body. In: Holler 1981, pp 239-253
47. Weber RJ (1979) Subjectivity in the valuation of games. In: Moeschlin O, Pallaschke D (eds) Game Theory and Related Topics. North Holland Publishing Co, Amsterdam, pp 129-136
48. Weber RJ (1988) Probabilistic values for games. In: Roth 1988, pp 101-11