Constitutionalism

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Whittington, Keith E ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conceptual constitutionalism; Constitutionalism; Constitutions; Democracy; Empirical constitutionalism; Judicial review; Liberalism; Normative constitutionalism; Power; Rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867688859     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0016     Document Type: Chapter

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