Legislative entrenchment: A reappraisal

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 1665-1704

  Posner, Eric A ^a   Vermeule, Adrian ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041805374     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797534     Document Type: Review

References (67)

1. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90).
2. In Winstar, the Court held that the government had breached various contracts with financial institutions, in violation of the Contracts Clause, which the Court treated as a specific textual exception to the anti-entrenchment principle. We discuss the relationship between entrenchment and governmental contracts in Section II.F.
3. See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879).
4. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
5. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
6. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
7. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
8. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
9. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
10. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
11. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
12. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed. 2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996) (1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act . . . bind or frustrate a future" Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed., London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments we rebut in Section I.D.
13. For discussion of these authors, see infra Section I.D.
14. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 502 (1997). Klarman also discusses entrenchment in our sense; he calls it "cross-temporal entrenchment" and condemns it as "inconsistent with the democratic principle that present majorities rule themselves." Id. at 509. We critique this argument from simple majoritarianism infra Subsection I.D.2.
15. 287 U.S. 315, 317 (1932).
16. 100 U.S. 548, 561 (1879).
17. Reichelderfer, 287 U.S. at 318, 321.
18. Newton, 100 U.S. at 559-60.
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
20. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (stating that, where an earlier and a later statute conflict, "the last expression of the sovereign will must control"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION 1054 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the "obvious principle" that the later-enacted statute controls).
21. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (stating that, where an earlier and a later statute conflict, "the last expression of the sovereign will must control"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION 1054 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the "obvious principle" that the later-enacted statute controls).
22. David Strauss has suggested to us that a particular legal system might simply contain a rule of recognition holding that entrenched statutes lacking self-reference - PR′ in our example -are effective and may not be repealed. The later legislature's two-stage repeal would then violate the rules of the game in a straightforward way. On this view, self-reference is otiose when the rule of recognition does allow entrenchment and inadequate when it does not. We need not decide whether the rule-of-recognition account is superior to the self-reference account, however. So long as either account holds, the later two-stage repeal is blocked, and the argument that entrenchment is conceptually impossible fails. The examples of entrenching provisions that we collect below sometimes display self-reference and sometimes do not.
23. See Eule, supra note 4, at 406 n.122.
24. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (remarking that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact . . . are what I mean by the law"), with Reed Dickerson, Toward a Legal Dialectic, 61 IND. L.J. 315, 317 (1986) ("Being preoccupied with the social pathology addressed by case law, legal minds continue to be jurisprudentially scarred by such discredited dogmas as . . . Judge Holmes' assumption that law consists only of predictions of what courts will do.").
25. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (remarking that "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact . . . are what I mean by the law"), with Reed Dickerson, Toward a Legal Dialectic, 61 IND. L.J. 315, 317 (1986) ("Being preoccupied with the social pathology addressed by case law, legal minds continue to be jurisprudentially scarred by such discredited dogmas as . . . Judge Holmes' assumption that law consists only of predictions of what courts will do.").
26. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-908 (1994).
27. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
28. This point recalls Stephen Holmes's argument that constitutions take contentious issues off the table. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 215-18 (1995). We add that Congresses, in addition to constitutional assemblies, can make a similar determination and implement it through entrenchment.
29. The standard analysis is in JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 63-72 (1962).
30. This assumption should be uncontroversial, particularly given the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Given the rationales for entrenchment set out in Section I.C above, entrenchment will often be "necessary" to the execution of federal policy on the capacious definition given to that term in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-20 (1819), which treats "necessary" as a synonym for "useful" or "conducive to." As for "proper," that term at most cross-references allocations of power and supervening prohibitions established elsewhere in the Constitution. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Our claim is that there is no independent constitutional prohibition against entrenching statutes, so there can be nothing "improper" about their enactment.
31. This assumption should be uncontroversial, particularly given the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Given the rationales for entrenchment set out in Section I.C above, entrenchment will often be "necessary" to the execution of federal policy on the capacious definition given to that term in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-20 (1819), which treats "necessary" as a synonym for "useful" or "conducive to." As for "proper," that term at most cross-references allocations of power and supervening prohibitions established elsewhere in the Constitution. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Our claim is that there is no independent constitutional prohibition against entrenching statutes, so there can be nothing "improper" about their enactment.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
33. Note that the technical question is just whether the entrenching component or clause of a statute is valid, not whether the remainder of the statute - its content - is valid. This distinction never makes a difference to our argument, however, so for brevity we often refer in shorthand to the question of whether "entrenching statutes" are valid.
34. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 504-05.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
36. Nor do the specific grants of power in Article I and elsewhere. When, for example, the Constitution says that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, there is no reason to think that the provision speaks to the allocation of commerce-regulating power across successive Congresses. Rather, it delegates to the Congress as such a power that would otherwise reside exclusively in the states. See id. amend. X.
37. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). We neither need nor intend to take a position on the standard question of whether the Vesting Clause of Article II confers an independent "executive" power on the President, with the content of that power to be inferred from background norms, or instead serves as a mere placeholder for the specific presidential powers listed later in the same Article. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 80 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1851) (arguing that "[t]he different mode of expression employed in [the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II] serves to confirm this inference" that the authority vested in the President is not limited to the specific cases of executive power delineated in Article II).
38. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). We neither need nor intend to take a position on the standard question of whether the Vesting Clause of Article II confers an independent "executive" power on the President, with the content of that power to be inferred from background norms, or instead serves as a mere placeholder for the specific presidential powers listed later in the same Article. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 80 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1851) (arguing that "[t]he different mode of expression employed in [the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II] serves to confirm this inference" that the authority vested in the President is not limited to the specific cases of executive power delineated in Article II).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
40. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90.
41. See infra Section II.D.
42. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90 ("Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's ordinances could bind the present parliament."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 152-53 n.3 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1878) (rooting an anti-entrenchment principle in a norm of equality across legislatures); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting that courts have followed the last-in-time rule because "[t]hey thought it reasonable that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that which was the last indication of its will should have the preference"); see also Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (holding that entrenchment is impermissible because "[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to [public interests] as its predecessors").
43. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90 ("Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's ordinances could bind the present parliament."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 152-53 n.3 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1878) (rooting an anti-entrenchment principle in a norm of equality across legislatures); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting that courts have followed the last-in-time rule because "[t]hey thought it reasonable that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that which was the last indication of its will should have the preference"); see also Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (holding that entrenchment is impermissible because "[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to [public interests] as its predecessors").
44. Note, however, that Cooley was confused when he suggested that in a regime permitting entrenchment, "one legislature could . . . reduce the legislative power of its successors; and the process might be repeated, until, one by one, the subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from their control." COOLEY, supra note 30, at 152. The mistake here is the suppressed premise that "the subjects of legislation" remain the same over time. In fact, new issues arise with changes in technology, society, and politics, so that the later legislature will always have the opportunity to address policy questions that earlier legislatures could not have envisioned.
45. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 505.
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 30, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton).
47. Id.; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90 (listing the anti-entrenchment principle that "[a]cts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not" among other "rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes").
48. See infra Subsection I.D.1.f.
49. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 17, at 230.
50. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 894 (1996).
51. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 84 (8th ed. 1915).
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 63; see also O. Hood Phillips, Self-Limitation by the United Kingdom Parliament, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 461 (1975).
54. A recent example is the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973, which declares that Northern Ireland will remain in the United Kingdom unless a majority of its residents consent to secession. Although the law does not by its terms entrench itself, that is a plausible interpretation. See Phillips, supra note 38, at 445-46.
55. See cases cited supra note 3.
56. An example is the Septennial Act of 1716, which overturned the entrenchment of three-year parliamentary terms enacted by the Triennial Act of 1694. See Eule, supra note 4, at 391.
57. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
59. Article V states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . . U.S. CONST. art. V.
60. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994).
61. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1994).
62. The two provisions are Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 and Clause 4. Article V allowed both provisions to be amended after 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
63. See id.
64. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 126 n.1.
65. See supra Section I.D.
66. Eule, supra note 4, at 443.
67. Id. at 444.