Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

Review of International Political Economy

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 663-688

  Young, Kevin L ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Basel Committee; Financial regulation; interest groups; regulatory capture; transnational lobbying

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867608337     PISSN: 09692290     EISSN: 14664526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2011.624976     Document Type: Article

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