Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective

The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Bennett, Andrew ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

1898 Fashoda crisis; Bayesian inference; Bayesian logic; Cold War; Degrees of Freedom; First World War; Process tracing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924086352     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199286546.003.0030     Document Type: Chapter

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