Strategic bidding in vertically integrated power markets with an application to the Italian electricity auctions

Energy Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 2046-2057

  Bosco, Bruno ^a   Parisio, Lucia ^a   Pelagatti, Matteo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Electricity markets; Market power; Optimal bid functions; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; BILATERAL CONTRACTS; COST-INCREASES; ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS; ELECTRICITY MARKET; ELECTRICITY PRICES; EQUILIBRIUM PRICE; ESTIMATED COSTS; FUEL PRICES; GENERATION COST; INTEGRATED POWER; ITALIAN COMPANIES; MARKET DATA; MARKET POWER; OIL PRICES; OPTIMAL BIDDING; PRICE-COST MARGIN; STRATEGIC BIDDING; TIME VARYING; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS;

COMMERCE; COST ESTIMATING; COST FUNCTIONS; ELASTICITY; ELECTRICITY; INDUSTRY; OPTIMIZATION;

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS;

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; ENERGY MARKET; PRICE DYNAMICS; STRATEGIC APPROACH; TRANSACTION COST;

ITALY;

EID: 84866787323     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.11.005     Document Type: Article

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