Using restructured electricity supply industries to understand oligopoly industry outcomes

Utilities Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 227-246

  Wolak, Frank A ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Diagnosing market power; Electricity auction design; Electricity market design; Market performance measurement

Indexed keywords

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; ENERGY MARKET; METHODOLOGY; OLIGOPOLY;

EID: 78649768558     PISSN: 09571787     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2010.09.002     Document Type: Article

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