Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1233-1268

  Crawford, Gregory S ^a   Crespo, Joseph ^b   Tauchen, Helen ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b Wood Mackenzie   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetry; Bid function equilibrium; Electricity; England and Wales; Multi unit auctions

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE; COST EFFECTIVENESS; ELECTRICITY;

BID FUNCTION EQUILIBRIUM; BIDDING ASYMMETRIES; HETEROGENEOUS COSTS; MULTI UNIT AUCTIONS;

MARKETING;

EID: 35449002409     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.001     Document Type: Article

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