Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock?

International Political Science Review

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 475-493

  Underdal, Arild ^a   Hovi, Jon ^a   Kallbekken, Steffen ^a   Skodvin, Tora ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

climate change; contingencies; cooperation; mitigation; policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865791304     PISSN: 01925121     EISSN: 1460373X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0192512111432564     Document Type: Article

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