Value relations revisited

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 133-164

  Rabinowicz, Wlodek ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865730808     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267112000144     Document Type: Article

References (41)

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