I - Incommensurability and vagueness

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 71-94

  Rabinowicz, Wlodek ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65849455029     PISSN: 03097013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00173.x     Document Type: Article

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