Beyond dispute: International judicial institutions as lawmakers

German Law Journal

Volumn 12, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 979-1003

  von Bogdandy, Armin ^a   Venzke, Ingo ^b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

^b GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865545688     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200017193     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 NYU JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLITICS 709 (1999).
2. 2 The creation and stabilization of normative expectations is considered by many, otherwise diverging, contemporary theories as the core function of law, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 427 (1997); NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 151 (1995).
3. 4 Cf. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EJIL 73 (2009).
4. INGO VENZKE, ON WORDS AND DEEDS. HOW THE PRACTICE OF INTERPRETATION DEVELOPS INTERNATIONAL NORMS (unpublished doctoral thesis, 2010).
5. 7 Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in this issue.
6. 8 Stephan Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law, in: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 151 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010).
7. 9 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 18 (2008).
8. 10 Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment Tribunals' Perspective, in: THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 323, 344 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds, 2008).
9. , MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1010 (2008); PATRICK DAILLIER, ALAIN PELLET, MATHIAS FORTEAU & NGUYEN QUOC DINH, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 923 (2009).
10. 12 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS (2001); Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zürn, Von der nationalen zur post‐nationalen Konstellation, in: TRANSFORMATIONEN DES STAATES?, 19 (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zürn eds, 2006);
11. Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 EJIL 885 (2004); VENZKE (note 5).
12. 13 For a fierce and unconvincing argument on the illegitimacy, or, at best, plain futility of international adjudication, see ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009); with regard to the ECJ, see Dietrich Murswiek, Die heimliche Entwicklung des Unionsvertrages zur europäischen Oberverfassung, 28 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 481, 484 (2009).
13. 15 Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, in this issue.
14. 16 Cf. Joachim Lege, Was Juristen wirklich tun. Jurisprudential Realism, in: RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT, 207, 216 (Winfried Brugger, Ulfried Neumann & Stephan Kirste eds, 2008); RALPH CHRISTENSEN & HANS KUDLICH, THEORIE RICHTERLICHEN BEGRÜNDENS 26 (2001).
15. (Pieter H. F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds, 2010).
16. 18 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 12‐13 (1964). Consider the ICJ’s emblematic pronouncements in Fisheries Jurisdiction (Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 25 July 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, 3, para. 53; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para. 18.
17. 19 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A131‐148 (2008 [1781]). Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 9 (2007).
18. 20 HANS KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163 (1942); HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE. EINLEITUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE PROBLEMATIK 82‐83 (1934).
19. 26 HANS‐JOACHIM KOCH & HELMUT RÜßMANN, JURISTISCHE BEGRÜNDUNGSLEHRE 5, 69 (1982). See specifically on the lawmaking dimension of judicial decisions id., 248.
20. 27 This is also the central theme in RORBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT (1998). For a concise introduction into this theme, see Robert B. Brandom, Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality, in: ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM, 186 (2000).
21. 29 William S. Dodge, Res Judicata, in: THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2006), available at: http://www.mpepil.com.
22. 30 Christian Kirchner, Zur konsequentialistischen Interpretationsmethode, in: INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE, 37, 39 (Tomas Eger, Jochen Bigus, Claus Ott & Georg von Wangenheim eds, 2008).
23. 31 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 76, 209 (1996); Iain Scobbie, Res Judicata, Precedent, and the International Court: A Preliminary Sketch, 20 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (1999);
24. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 321 (2009); Armin Höland, Wie wirkt Rechtsprechung?, 30 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 23, 35 (2009). Also see Oellers‐Frahm (note 14), 1046
25. 35 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), 14 October 2004, 2 BvR1481/04, 111 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 307, for an English translation, see http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html, margin number 68 (referring to a domestic court’s duty to take a decision of the ECHR into account).
26. 37 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 13 July 2009, para. 64. Cf. Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 443 (2010).
27. 38 See RICHTERLICHE RECHTSFORTBILDUNG. ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN, AUFTRAG UND GRENZEN (Hochschullehrer der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg eds, 1986).
28. 39 This distinction is held up in the use of different terms in German‐speaking legal science whereas in the world of common law the innovative judge frequently simply figures as lawmaker. South Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Justice Holmes, dissenting); Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 22 (1972).
29. 41 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 155‐223 (1958) (speaking of “judicial legislation”).
30. 42 See Werner Conze, Demokratie, in: 1 GESCHICHTLICHE GRUNDBEGRIFFE, 848 (Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck eds, 1972).
31. 43 See Hermann Mosler & Karin Oellers‐Frahm, Article 94, in: THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A COMMENTARY, 1174, 1176 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002).
32. 44 Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 201, 202 (1957); RALF DAHRENDORF, ÜBER DEN URSPRUNG DER UNGLEICHHEIT UNTER DEN MENSCHEN 20 (1961).
33. 46 See Ingo Venzke, International Bureaucracies in a Political Science Perspective—Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law, 9 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1401 (2008).
34. 47 Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1375, 1381 (2008).
35. 48 Reputational costs are relevant even for such weighty and mighty actors as the United States. In a rational choice perspective, see ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 71 (2008).
36. 79 Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs, Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, in this issue.