International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law

German Law Journal

Volumn 9, Issue 11, 2008, Pages 1402-1428

  Venzke, Ingo ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85178033861     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200000523     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. 1 See Alexander Wendt, Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design 55 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1019 (2001).
2. 3 JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW v (2002).
3. 4 See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, in this issue.
4. 7 Susan Strange, Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 37 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). See Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Realist Global Governance: Revisiting Cave! Hic Dragones and Beyond, in CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. COHERENCE, CONTESTATION AND WORLD ORDER 17 (Alice D. Ba & Matthew J. Hoffmann eds., 2005).
5. 8 Mearsheimer (note 6).
6. 9 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 1-20 (1989); Verbeek (note 6).
7. 10 For an overview of strategies and examples of such research see e.g. Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 39-51 (1995); Beth A. Simmons & Lisa L. Martin, International Organizations and Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 192, 199-200 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002); HELMUT BREITMEIER, ORAN R. YOUNG & MICHAEL ZÜRN, ANALYZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: FROM CASE STUDY TO DATABASE (2006); Bauer, (note 2).
8. 11 See Friedrich V. Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of Art and an Art of the State, 40 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 753, 759 (1986).
9. 12 CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 68-87 (2001).
10. 15 Id. at 13-15; Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, 42 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 9-16 (1998).
11. 16 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney (note 13), at 15-16; Jack L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-35 (2005).
12. 17 See Ekkehart Reimer, Transnationales Steuerrecht, in INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, 181 (Christoph Möllers, Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter eds., 2007).
13. 18 KEOHANE & MARTIN (note 9), at 43-44.
14. 19 Harald Müller, The Evolution of Verification: Lessons from the Past for the Present, 14 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 333 (1993); James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 269 (1998).
15. 20 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney (note 13), at 18-19; George Norman and Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 541 (2005); Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (EJIL) 579 (2005); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 761 (2001).
16. 21 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney (note 13), at 17.
17. 23 Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 421, 439 (2000); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 385 (2000).
18. 24 Abbott & Snidal (note 15), at 18.
19. 25 Philipp Dann, The World Bank’s Legal Regime, in this issue.
20. 26 Abbott & Snidal (note 15), at 18.
21. 27 See Jean D'Aspremont, Abuse of the Legal Personality of International Organizations and the Responsibility of Member States, 4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 91 (2007).
22. 28 Clemens Feinäugle, in this issue; Erika de Wet, Holding International Bureaucracies Accountable: the complementary Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review, in this issue.
23. 33 YI-CHONG XU & PATRICK MORAY WELLER, THE GOVERNANCE OF WORLD TRADE. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS AND GATT/WTO 264-265 (2004).
24. 35 See also Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications, 50 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 253, 255-257 (2006) (maintaining that a difference in interest is a constitutive element of IOs’ independence).
25. 36 Certainly there are various mechanisms for principals and other actors to improve the working of conditions and the control of international agents. That is the topic of the contribution by de Wet (note 28). For the limits of contractual or text-based delegation, see Jan Klabbers, On Rationalism in Politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the World Trade Organization, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 405 (2005); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LNTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (2004).
26. 37 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney (note 13), at 8.
27. 39 ROBERT W. COX & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 7 (1973).
28. 40 MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 1046-1092 (2006).
29. 41 Id., 14; cf. Olsen (note 2). See, however, the cautionary remarks in ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE. FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 96 (1964).
30. 44 Id. at 5. See Bauer (note 2). Bauer refers to Claire A. Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333, 324 (Claire A. Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (authority “involves a surrendering of individual judgment, an acceptance of its dictates base not on the merits of any particular pronouncement but on a belief in the rightness of the authority of itself”).
31. 45 BARNETT & FINNEMORE (note 2), at 29.
32. 46 DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 19-24 (1943).
33. 47 See BARNETT & FINNEMORE (note 2), at 21-22; Thomas Risse, Transnational Governance and Legitimacy, in GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY: COMPARING NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 179, 188 (Arthur Benz & Yannis Papadopoulos eds., 2006); see also DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE. REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 111-146 (2004).
34. 48 DAVID MITRANY, THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS 113-122 (1975); HAAS (note 41), at 6.
35. 49 MITRANY (note 48), at 250-251.
36. 50 HAAS (note 41), at 88. The question of what is political indeed appears to be one of subjective assessment in the eyes of the beholder rather than one of content or issue area. See CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN. TEXT VON 1932 MIT EINEM VORWORT UND 3 COROLLARIEN 26-37 (1963). On this aspect of Schmitt’s concept of the political, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 440-445 (2001).
37. 51 Jochen von Bernstorff, The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as a Case in Point, in TRANSNATIONAL FOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 257 (Christian Joerges, I. Sand & G. Teubner eds., 2004).
38. 54 See e.g. Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 487 (2001); Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 325 (1996).
39. 56 EGON F. RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT. A GREAT EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 239-246 (1945).
40. 57 Arthur Sweetser, The World's Civil Service, 30 IOWA LAW REVIEW 478, 478 (1945).
41. 58 See Liese & Weinlich (note 2), at 491, 500-510.
42. 59 See e.g. Art. 8(2) FAO Constitution; Art. 6(4) WTO Agreement; Art. 4 Section V IBDR Articles of Agreement; Art. 11 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
43. 60 See Karl Th. Paschke, UNO von innen - die Besonderheiten einer multinationalen Bürokratie, in PRAXISHANDBUCH UNO. DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN IM LICHTE GLOBALER HERAUSFORDERUNGEN 553, 565-566 (Sabine von Schorlemer ed., 2003); see also (note 55).
44. 61 See Robert W. Cox, The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization, 23 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 205 (1969).
45. 66 See ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER. THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1990).
46. 67 See John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 557, 569-70 (1975) (an early account). This insight stands unrelated to an actors’ mode of action, be it strategic or communicative.
47. 68 WEBER (note 40), at 226 (“Die bürokratische Verwaltung bedeutet: Herrschaft kraft Wissen: dies ist ihr spezifisch rationaler Grundcharakter.”).
48. 70 See Roland Vaubel, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations, 1 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 125 (2006).
49. 71 Dann (note 25); BARNETT & FINNEMORE (note 2), at 165.
50. 72 See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1, 12 (1992).
51. 73 Erika de Wet, Governance through Promotion and Persuasion: The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, in this issue.
52. 77 Ernst B. Haas, Is there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes, 29 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 827, 858-9 (1975).
53. 78 BREITMEIER, YOUNG & ZÜRN (note 10); Helmut Breitmeier, Die Output-orientierte Legitimität des globalen Regierens. Empirische Befunde aus der quantitativen Erforschung internationaler Umweltregime, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN 39 (2006).
54. 79 See BARNETT & FINNEMORE (note 2), at 31-34; HAAS (note 66), at 11.
55. 80 See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations, 42 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 245 (1988).
56. 81 FRITZ WILHELM SCHARPF, REGIEREN IN EUROPA. EFFEKTIV UND DEMOKRATISCH? 17-20 (1999).
57. 82 See de Wet (note 28); Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130 (David Held & Mathias Koening-Archibugi eds., 2002).
58. 84 Darren G. Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 199, 210-212 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).
59. 86 Id. at 1081 (“Bürokratische Verwaltung ist ihrer Tendenz nach stets Verwaltung mit Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit”).
60. 87 Anuscheh Farahat, in this issue.
61. 89 See Eyal Benvenisti, ”Coalitions of the Willing“and the Evolution of Informal International Law, in “COALITIONS OF THE WILLING” AVANTGARDE OR THREAT? (Christian Callies, Georg Nolte & Tobias Stoll eds., forthcoming), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=875590.
62. 90 Dann (note 25); Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 1, 3 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
63. 93 Emanuel Adler & Steven Bernstein, Knowledge in Power: The Epistemic Construction of Global Governance, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 294 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
64. 94 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Michael Zürn, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 260 (2004).
65. 95 See Ian Johnstone, The Power of Interpretive Communities, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 186 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). Johnstone builds on the concept of “interpretative community” developed by Stanley Fish. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY. CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERATURE AND LEGAL STUDIES 141-160 (1989).
66. 99 See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 197 (2004).
67. 100 For the functioning and impact of NGOs see in particular MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS. ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
68. 104 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 473 (1976).
69. 105 Renate Mayntz, Governance Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie?, in GOVERNANCE-FORSCHUNG 11 (Gunnar Schuppert ed., 2006).
70. 108 See Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EJIL 247, 266-67 (2006).
71. 109 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Steward, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 15, 51 (2005).
72. 110 Wendt (note 1), at 1046. See Christian Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory, 12 EJIL 573, 580-585 (2001).
73. 111 It builds on Oliver Williamson’s definition of governance as “an exercise in assessing the efficacy of alternative modes (means) of organization.” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 11 (1996). Williamson was a student of Ronald Coase who took initial and path breaking steps in exploring the relation between institutional design and efficiency of outcomes. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
74. 114 ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER. POWER, VALUES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 55 (2007).
75. 115 Jan Klabbers, Two Concepts of International Organization, 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW 277 (2005).
76. 118 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 194-95 (1958).
77. 119 See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EJIL 187, 214 (2006).
78. 120 Only the substantive yardstick of human rights might be applicable; see Jochen von Bernstorff, in this issue; Jürgen Habermas, Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?, in DER GESPALTENE WESTEN 113, 142 (Jürgen Habermas ed., 2004).
79. 121 See Eyal Benvenisti, The interplay between actors as a determination of the evolution of administrative law in international institutions, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 319 (2005).
80. 122 Borgumil, Jann & Nullmeier (note 107), at 18.
81. 123 See von Bernstorff, in this issue; von Bogdandy (note 32), at 625-650.
82. 124 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 814, 838 (1987) (“Law is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the things named … It confers upon the reality which arises from its classificatory operations the maximum permanence.”). See also Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zaslof, Power and International Law, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (2006).
83. 126 See Ingeborg Maus, Das Verhältnis der Politikwissenschaft zur Rechtswissenschaft: Bemerkungen zu den Folgen politologischer Autarkie, in POLITIK UND RECHT 76-120 (Miachel Becker & Ruth Zimmerling eds., 2006).
84. 127 von Bernstorff, in this issue; Benvenisti (note 113).
85. 129 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on 16 January 2008, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities. See De Wet (note 28).
86. 130 See Borgumil, Jann & Nullmeier (note 107), at 18.