Does competition reduce the risk of bank failure?

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 10, 2010, Pages 3638-3664

  Martinez Miera, David ^a   Repullo, Rafael ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b CEMFI   (Spain)

^c CEPR ^*  (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956938879     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhq057     Document Type: Article

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