Political competition between differentiated candidates

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 249-271

  Krasa, Stefan ^a   Polborn, Mattias K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Multidimensional policy; Political competition; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864317483     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.003     Document Type: Article

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