'One and a half dimensional' preferences and majority rule

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 321-335

  Groseclose, T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846055104     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0166-3     Document Type: Article

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