Lumpy property

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

Volumn 160, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1955-1993

  Fennell, Lee Anne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 84864029607     PISSN: 00419907     EISSN: 19428537     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (119)

1. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (observing that the bridge is a "standard example[]" of a "single-step good[]", but qualifying this example by noting the wide spectrum of possible bridge types).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 162-69 (2011) (using "the parable of the bridge" to illustrate proportionality and leverage in intellectual property). Lumpiness has implications for other areas of law as well.
3. For a brief overview, see Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 395), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1106421.
4. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 69, 76-79 (2005) (positing that less costly ways of delineating property rights produce lumpy, asymmetric entitlements). Lumpiness also relates closely to the literatures on economies of scale and land assembly problems, where larger holdings may be disproportionately more valuable than the sum of smaller holdings.
5. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1332-35 (1993) (discussing situations in which "returns increase with parcel size");
6. see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 659 (1998) (addressing problems in assembling property entitlements into useful bundles).
7. Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982).
8. see also Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & PHIL. 245, 248-50 (1987) (contrasting "pure step goods" such as bridges, which require "one big production step", with goods that can be produced in smaller increments). Another sort of lumpiness stems from production limitations rather than consumption utility, as where a product can only be supplied profitably in a particular size or quantity.
9. with MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 57-58 (1988) (recognizing the possibility of "lumpy goods with sloping risers" that exhibit linearity "after the initial production threshold is crossed").
10. See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass (pt. I): Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522, 525-28 (1985) (examining the relationship between production-function shapes and the prospects for collective action);
11. Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 971-78 (2004) (exploring this point in the context of land use and resource entitlements).
12. For graphical representations and analyses of possible land assembly scenarios, see, for example, John F. McDonald, What Is Public Use? Eminent Domain and the Kelo Decision, 5 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 10, 15-19 (2007)
13. and Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 972-75.
14. See ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF TIME AND SPACE 208, 213 (1977).
15. See generally Stephen Shmanske & Daniel Packey, Lumpy Demand and the Diagrammatics of Aggregation, 30 J. ECON. EDUC. 64 (1999).
16. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L. J. 383, 385 (2002) (explaining that because a public utility can only add capacity in large chunks-as by installing a new generator or power plant-"new capacity will often give the utility more capacity than it needs for immediate purposes").
17. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT 21-28, 100-07 (2007) (describing "lumpy markets" and discussing how fixed costs can impact product availability).
18. HENRY FORD WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922);
19. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 24-27), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=2017816.
20. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (discussing the significance of the distinction between in rem rights associated with property and in personam rights associated with contract). (Pubitemid 33652111)
21. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1719, 1755-57 (2004) (describing property's "exclusion strategy");
22. see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91-110 (1978)
23. see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702 (2012) ("The exclusion strategy defines a chunk of the world-a thing-under the owner's control⋯."). To say that an exclusionbased property interest requires complete boundaries does not mean that it requires impermeable boundaries, nor does it require that the boundaries constitute the only means of protecting the property's value.
24. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 16-18 (2009) (drawing connections between exclusion strategies and modularity, and noting that modules hide information as a way of managing complexity).
25. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972) (distinguishing "property rule" protection, under which property may only be transferred if the owner chooses to sell, from "liability rule" protection, under which property may be transferred against the will of the owner at an externally determined price).
26. see also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1525-31 (1984) (discussing discontinuities produced by sanctions).
27. See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 264 (N. J. 1969) (holding that a good faith encroacher who constructed substantial improvements may be eligible for equitable relief conveying the encroached-upon land to him at fair market value).
28. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 13-14 (2009).
29. See, e.g., Family Wait List Lottery FAQs, CHI. HOUSING AUTHORITY, http://www.thecha.org/pages/family-wait-list-lottery-faqs/76.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
30. David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 655-58 (2004).
31. See, e.g., 24 C. F. R. § 982. 201 (b) (2) (2011)
32. For a related discussion, see CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 67-81, 127-29 (2007).
33. see also Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 298-99 (1948) (presenting the Friedman-Savage utility curve, which hypothesizes that there are intervals in which the marginal utility of money increases);
34. Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 929-39 (2011) (providing an overview of the Friedman-Savage curve and related empirical work).
35. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 (2000).
36. For a discussion of the numerus clausus doctrine as a "regulatory platform", see Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1644-50 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Rectifying the Tax Treatment of Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 62 TAX L. REV. 505, 508, 514-15 (2009) (cataloguing the tax obstacles to one such hybrid, shared appreciation mortgages, which entitle lenders to a share of the property's appreciation instead of fixed interest payments);
38. Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project 24-28 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=410141 (describing regulatory barriers to implementing a home equity insurance program in Syracuse, New York).
39. See ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS: A NEW APPROACH TO A MARKET AT A CROSSROADS 6 (1997) ("The 'all or nothing' constraint on home ownership forces households to make the stark choice between rental accommodations' disadvantages and complete ownership's harsh financial realities.").
40. For a critique of this claim, see Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1484-88 (2004).
41. See also Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law (revisiting the standardization arguments with respect to third-party information costs), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148, 157-65 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
42. See Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L. J. 1285, 1344-45 (2011).
43. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. J. 1163, 1173-82 (1999).
44. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2008) ("Aggregation and disaggregation of parcels in order to permit each use as it becomes most efficient is not an easy matter.");
45. Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (discussing the problem of shifts in efficient scale over time), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 45, at 35, 48.
46. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 20-25 (2007) (describing how contiguity and shape factor into the habitat value of a tract).
47. Cf. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275, 307-08 (2008) ("Pre-owned resources, and land in particular, bear the legal and physical imprint of the agendas set by prior owners." (footnote omitted)).
48. See PETER WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA: ITS VALUE, USE, AND CONTROL 6 (1981) ("Will Rogers advised the whole country: 'Buy land. They ain't making any more of the stuff.'").
49. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (2005) (observing that a landowner's monopoly is usually not problematic);
50. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75 (1986) (discussing assembly problems that can arise from property owners' monopoly power).
51. See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 99, 120-21 (2010) (arguing that Michael Heller's approach implicitly and incorrectly assumes that we can identify a resource's "ideal use" in advance and arrange property rights to achieve it).
52. Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 627 (2002) ("[S]ub-optimal fragmentation can be easily corrected ex post, while excessive fragmentation is likely to be irreversible⋯.").
53. See, e.g., CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 187 (1980) (describing the potential holdout problem among opponents of enclosure and explaining how legislation addressed it);
54. Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights (explaining how earlier stakeholders can impede the evolution of environmental regulation), in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 97 (Peter Newman ed., 1998);
55. See Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCS.) 360 (2012) (comparing assembly problems exhibiting perfect complementarity with those that require all the components in one of several possible clusters, as well as with those that require one component from each of several clusters).
56. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 119-24 (2004).
57. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 438 (1982)
58. See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criticizing the distinction that takings law draws between physical impositions and reductions in value).
59. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
60. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted);
61. see also Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 538-39 (2005)
62. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 124).
63. The phrase was based on Frank Michelman's notion of a "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation. " Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
64. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-79 (1998) (coining the term "conceptual severance" and tracing the concept's use in the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence). If litigants were allowed to slice up their interests in property conceptually, any regulatory encroachment could be treated as the elimination of "all" of the interest that was regulated away.
65. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 331 (2002) ("Petitioners' 'conceptual severance' argument is unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.'"
66. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 130-31)).
67. Penn Central, 438 U. S. at 130 ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.").
68. See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1257-62 (2010) (emphasizing American property law's differential treatment of governmental acts that reduce value and those that interfere with exclusion or other core property rights).
69. For a novel discontinuity-based argument for the distinction (albeit one that would require some changes in current takings doctrine), see Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 223-56 (2002).
70. For discussion on perceptions of property and the extent to which those perceptions are manipulable, see, for example, Jonathan Remy Nash, Packaging Property: The Effect of Paradigmatic Framing of Property Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691, 715-24 (2009)
71. and Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 479-84 (2010).
72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
73. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 112-13 (2011)
74. Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 247, 265-66 (2011) (contending that the plurality's view of judicial takings is inconsistent with an "evolutionary view of the law").
75. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 62 (1965) (making an analogous distinction "between the role of government as participant and the government as mediator in the process of competition among economic claims");
76. cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 421, 424-28 (2010) (describing a "boundary maintenance" approach to regulatory takings that compares how much a given regulatory act resembles eminent domain with how much the act resembles an exercise of the police power).
77. *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002);
78. see also R. H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 313, 322-27 (1983) (assessing the prospects for equitable division in the law of finding and noting examples of its limited use in cases involving joint finders).
79. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 113 (7th ed. 2010) (noting that property law "awards a finder all or nothing, subject to the rights of the true owner");
80. see also LEO KAT Z, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139-55 (2011) (noting the prevalence of "either/or" results in law and discussing possible explanations and related challenges).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N. W.2d 914, 916 (S. D. 1946)
82. See 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980)
83. see also Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S. E.2d 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004)
84. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357, 365-66 (2001)
85. see also Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 194-201 (2011) (compiling views on the bundle-ofrights conceptualization of property). The metaphor of a "bundle of sticks" stands for the same idea as the "bundle of rights" and is "an only slightly less popular" formulation.
86. Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 215 (2011).
87. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 279, 281-87 (2011). Other scholars have attacked the metaphor based on different sets of concerns.
88. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994).
89. The state of play can be inferred from a recent symposium devoted entirely to the bundle-of-rights metaphor. Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193(2011), http://econjwatch.org/issues/volume-8-issue- 3-september-2011.
90. For discussion of the many ways the bundle metaphor might be understood, see generally J. E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). Merrill flags a related problem in interpreting the Supreme Court's use of the metaphor: "how to distinguish between a horizontal stick and a lateral chop" through every stick, where only the latter is understood to be a compensable taking.
91. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247, 248 (2011).
92. See TONY HONORé, Ownership (enumerating eleven "standard incidents of ownership"), in MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161, 165-66 (1987).
93. (citing WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923))).
94. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEñALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 140 (2012) (describing the right to exclude as "pock-marked⋯ with exceptions").
95. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L. J. 2175, 2178-79 (1997).
96. But see Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 233 (2011)
97. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1023-24 (2011) (explaining that for social obligation theorists, property ownership involves both rights against others and duties to others);
98. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743-44 (2009) (maintaining that property serves a broad and incommensurable set of human values).
99. For a helpful overview and critique of different strands within the movement, see Ezra Rosser, Essay, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 11-21), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=2018030.
100. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963-64 (2009) (noting the advantages of "the basic exclusion mechanism" while acknowledging that exclusion "does not always have the last word").
101. See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1457-58 (1996) (presenting a view of public accommodations as "a form of property ownership that has limitations on the right to exclude built into it").
102. See Graham Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2 INT'L J. COMMONS 75, 78 (2008) (noting that higher levels of government are required to solve some problems, including discrimination).
103. (citing Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 170, 178-82 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997)).
104. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 296 (2008)
105. 42 U. S. C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
106. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 2011 at 1, 4 (proposing an option system that would induce low-valuing holders of certain entitlements to self-identify).
107. See, e.g., Steven R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks, 8 ECON J. WATCH 265, 268-69 (2011)
108. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 32-33 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that local public goods provide nonrival and nonexcludable benefits within "a small jurisdiction such as a municipality or a town").
109. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357, 375 (1974) ("The early history [of the British lighthouse system] shows that, contrary to the belief of many economists, a lighthouse service can be provided by private enterprise.").
110. See generally Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 205-09 (2009) (proposing an "expanded duty of restitution" that would widen the circumstances in which recipients of benefits must compensate the party who has provided them).
111. See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932);
112. see also Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 680 (1992) (defining Pigouvian taxes in the pollution context).
113. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-725 (b) (1) (2005)
114. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1667 (2000).
115. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
116. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 905-27 (2007)
117. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109-19 (2009).
118. cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L. J. 1027, 1102 (1995) (positing that endowment effects might be weaker in a liability rule regime);
119. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1572-74 (1998) (discussing experimental results on the influence of the available legal remedy on the endowment effect). (Pubitemid 128443469)