Control and contract design in research collaborations: A complete contract perspective

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 459-470

  Panico, Claudio ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Contracts; Control; Countervailing incentives; Research collaborations

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; CONTROL ENGINEERING; INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING; INDUSTRY;

ADVERSE SELECTION; COUNTERVAILING INCENTIVES; HIGH TECH INDUSTRY; PRIVATE INFORMATION; RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS; RESEARCH CONTRACTS; RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT; TECHNOLOGICAL SKILLS;

RISK MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84863984385     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.03.001     Document Type: Article

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