Employment relationships in knowledge-based firms: Who should have power

European Management Review

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 120-129

  Panico, Claudio ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bargaining power; Contracts; Control rights; Incentives; Negotiation

Indexed keywords

EID: 68149157988     PISSN: 17404754     EISSN: 17404762     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/emr.2009.9     Document Type: Article

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