Estimating preferences of circuit judges: A model of consensus voting

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 781-809

  Fischman, Joshua B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862320952     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/661512     Document Type: Article

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