Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 469-484

  Costas Pérez, Elena ^a   Solé Ollé, Albert ^a   Sorribas Navarro, Pilar ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b Institut d'Economia de Barcelona IEB   (Spain)

Author keywords

Accountability; Corruption; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862258931     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.05.007     Document Type: Article

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