Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 71-92

  Bosch, Núria ^a   Solé Ollé, Albert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Local government; Taxes; Voting; Yardstick competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751512186     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-006-6348-1     Document Type: Article

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