Political and judicial checks on corruption: Evidence from American state governments

Economics and Politics

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 33-61

  Alt, James E ^a   Lassen, David D ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; CORRUPTION; ELECTION; GOVERNMENT; LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 38849176907     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: 14680343     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x     Document Type: Article

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