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Volumn 99, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 13-26

Motives for sharing in social networks

Author keywords

Altruism; Reciprocity; Risk sharing; Sanctions; Sharing

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; GAME THEORY; RECIPROCITY; SOCIAL NETWORK;

EID: 84861830097     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.12.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (82)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.