Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition

Synthese

Volumn 181, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 515-529

  Vaesen, Krist ^a  

^a EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Credit; Extended cognition; Knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959700197     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0     Document Type: Article

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