Incentives, opportunism and behavioral uncertainty in electricity industries

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 65, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 1031-1039

  Niesten, Eva ^a   Jolink, Albert ^b  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Behavioral uncertainty; Energy firms; Incentive alignment; Revealed opportunism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861580523     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.03.012     Document Type: Article

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