Are tax-financed contributions to a public good completely crowded-out? Experimental evidence

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 96, Issue 7-8, 2012, Pages 596-603

  Gronberg, Timothy J ^a   Luccasen, R Andrew ^b   Turocy, Theodore L ^c   Van Huyck, John B ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Crowd out; Logit choice; Public goods; Warm glow

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860385178     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.04.001     Document Type: Article

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