The robustness of Kingma's crowd-out estimate: Evidence from new data on contributions to public radio

Public Choice

Volumn 123, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 463-476

  Manzoor, Sonia H ^a   Straub, John D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23044473196     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-7171-4     Document Type: Review

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