Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure

Social Neuroscience

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 269-279

  Cushman, Fiery ^a   Greene, Joshua D ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dilemmas; Moral luck; Morality; Philosophy; Social cognition; Social neuroscience; Trolley problem

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; CONFLICT; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MORALITY; PHILOSOPHY; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

COGNITION; CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); FEMALE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MORALS; PHILOSOPHY; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 84860321932     PISSN: 17470919     EISSN: 17470927     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2011.614000     Document Type: Article

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