The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform

Texas Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 7, 1999, Pages

  Issacharoff, Samuel ^a   Karlan, Pamela S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0346515485     PISSN: 00404411     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (10)

1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 583-84 (1964) (requiring decennial reapportionment and equipopulous districts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that claims of malapportionment are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause).
2. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 583-84 (1964) (requiring decennial reapportionment and equipopulous districts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that claims of malapportionment are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause).
3. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278-79 (asserting that neither the Warren Court nor the Burger Court sufficiently handled the issue of gerrymandering). As a practical matter, the Supreme Court's test for unconstitutional political gerrymanders, which requires the plaintiffs to show "consistent[] degrad[ation of] a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole," Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion), has essentially never been met. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 250 (outlining what plaintiffs must prove in a political gerrymandering case).
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278- 79 (asserting that neither the Warren Court nor the Burger Court sufficiently handled the issue of gerrymandering). As a practical matter, the Supreme Court's test for unconstitutional political gerrymanders, which requires the plaintiffs to show "consistent[] degrad[ation of] a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole," Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion), has essentially never been met. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 250 (outlining what plaintiffs must prove in a political gerrymandering case).
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278- 79 (asserting that neither the Warren Court nor the Burger Court sufficiently handled the issue of gerrymandering). As a practical matter, the Supreme Court's test for unconstitutional political gerrymanders, which requires the plaintiffs to show "consistent[] degrad[ation of] a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole," Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion), has essentially never been met. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 250 (outlining what plaintiffs must prove in a political gerrymandering case).
6. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (suggesting that race-conscious districting "may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract"); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (opinion of White, J.) (suggesting that states might draw majority-nonwhite districts in order to avoid dilution and "minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voters").
7. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (suggesting that race-conscious districting "may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract"); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (opinion of White, J.) (suggesting that states might draw majority-nonwhite districts in order to avoid dilution and "minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voters").
8. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb- 1 (1994). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (finding that North Carolina's redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the plan resulted in racial dilution of the vote).
9. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (finding that North Carolina's redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the plan resulted in racial dilution of the vote).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb- 1 (1994). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (finding that North Carolina's redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the plan resulted in racial dilution of the vote).