The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 147, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 1247-1260

  Gill, David ^a   Sgroi, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian learning; Bias; Certification; Information transmission; Marketing; Product launch; Reviewer; Soft test; Test; Tough test

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859440700     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.019     Document Type: Article

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