Sequential decisions with tests

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 663-678

  Gill, David ^a   Sgroi, Daniel ^b  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian updating; Endorsements; Herding; Sequential decision making; Tests

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649156358     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.004     Document Type: Article

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