Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: A dissociation of ownership and agency

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue MARCH 2012, 2012, Pages

  Kalckert, Andreas ^a   Henrik Ehrsson, H ^a  

^a KAROLINSKA INSTITUTE   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Body perception; Multisensory integration; Rubber hand illusion; Self recognition; Sense of agency; Sense of ownership; Volition; Voluntary movement

Indexed keywords

RUBBER;

ACTIVE MOVEMENT; ADULT; ARTICLE; BODY POSITION; COGNITION; CONTROLLED STUDY; EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; FEMALE; HAND MOVEMENT; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; ILLUSION; INDEX FINGER; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PASSIVE MOVEMENT; PROPRIOCEPTION; QUESTIONNAIRE; TASK PERFORMANCE; VOLUNTARY MOVEMENT;

EID: 84859054030     PISSN: 16625161     EISSN: 16625161     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00040     Document Type: Article

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