Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 639-681

  Baron, David P ^a   Hirsch, Alexander V ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common agency; Gridlock; Lobbying; Proto coalitions; Public policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858286832     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0628-4     Document Type: Article

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