The evolution of parental investment: Re-examining the anisogamy argument

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 299, Issue , 2012, Pages 113-119

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a   Robles, Jack ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Evolution; Parental care; Propagule size

Indexed keywords

ANIMAL; EVOLUTION; MUTATION; PARENTAL CARE; PARENTAL INVESTMENT; PROPAGULE;

ARTICLE; CHILD PARENT RELATION; FERTILIZATION; GAMETE; HETEROGAMY; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MOLECULAR DYNAMICS; MOLECULAR EVOLUTION; MUTATION; MUTATION RATE; PARENT; PARENTAL BEHAVIOR; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REPRODUCTION; STOCHASTIC MODEL;

ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; FEMALE; FERTILIZATION; GAME THEORY; MALE; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; PARENTING;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 84857920195     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.031     Document Type: Article

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