Why comply? Attitudes towards harvest regulations among Swedish fishers

Marine Policy

Volumn 36, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 969-976

  Jagers, Sverker C ^a   Berlin, Daniel ^b   Jentoft, Svein ^c  

^a LULEÅ UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

Author keywords

Co management; Compliance; Fisheries; Fisheries management; IUU fishing; Trust

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; FISHERY MANAGEMENT; FISHERY REGULATION; FISHING COMMUNITY; HARVESTING; MORALITY; OVERFISHING; STOCK ASSESSMENT; SURVEY METHOD;

SWEDEN;

EID: 84857672064     PISSN: 0308597X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2012.02.004     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Sumaila U.R., Alder J., Keith H. Global scope and economics of illegal fishing. Mar. Policy 2006, 30:696-703.
2. FAO. February 2011. http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3554e/y3554e01.htm.
3. Illegal fishing information. February 2011. http://www.illegal-fishing.info/index.php.
4. European Union . February 2011. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/maritime_affairs_and_fisheries/fisheries_resources_and_environment/l66052_en.htm.
5. Sartre J.P. Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology 1992, Washington Square Press, New York.
6. Williamson O.E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization 1975, Free Press, New York.
7. Becker H. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 1968, 76:169-217.
8. Hodgson G.H. Opportunism is not the only reason why firms exist: why an explanatory emphasis on opportunism may mislead management strategy. Ind. Corp. Change 2004, 13:401-418.
9. Raakjær Nielsen J. An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management. Mar. Policy 2003, 27:425-432.
10. Jentoft S., Mikalsen K.H. Vicious circle? The dynamics of rule production in norwegian fisheries management. Mar. Policy 2004, 28:127-135.
11. Sutinen J.G., Rieser A., Gauvin J.R. Measuring and explaining non-compliance in federally managed fisheries. Ocean Dev. Int. Law 1990, 21:335-372.
12. Phyne J. Changes from compliance to deterrence among federal fisheries officers: an atypical case of regulatory policing?. Can. Rev. Soc. Anthrop. 1992, 29:524-534.
13. Nøstbakken L. Fisheries law enforcement - a survey of the economic literature. Mar. Policy 2008, 32:293-300.
14. Jensen F., Vestergaard N. Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard. Resource Energy Econ. 2002, 24:281-299.
15. Raakjær Nielsen J., Mathiesen C. Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries lessons from Denmark. Mar. Policy 2003, 27:409-416.
16. McCay B.J., Jentoft S. Uncommon ground: critical perspectives on common property. Human Footprints on the Global Environment. Threats to Sustainability 2010, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA. E.A. Rosa, A. Diekmann, T. Dietz, C. Jaeger (Eds.).
17. Kuperan K., Sutinen J.G. Blue water crime deterrence, legitimacy and compliance in fisheries. Law Soc. 1998, 32:309-336.
18. Gezelius S. Do norms count? State regulation and compliance in a Norwegian fishing community. Acta Sociol. 2002, 45:305-314.
19. Hauck M. Rethinking small-scale fisheries compliance. Mar. Policy 2008, 32:635-642.
20. Gezelius S. Regulation and compliance in the Atlantic Fisheries. State/society relations in the management of natural resources 2003, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
21. Boonstra W.J., Dang N.B. A history of breaking laws - social dynamics of non-compliance in Vietnamese marine fisheries. Mar. Policy 2010, 34:1261-1267.
22. Hønneland G. A model of compliance in fisheries: theoretical foundations and practical applications. Ocean Coast. Manage. 1999, 42:699-716.
23. Gezelius S. Monitoring fishing mortality: compliance in Norwegian offshore fisheries. Mar. Policy 2006, 30:462-469.
24. Hatcher A., Jaffry H., Thébaud O., Bennet E. Normative and social influences affecting compliance with fishery regulations. Land Econ. 2000, 76:448-461.
25. Rittel H.W.J., Webber M.M. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sci. 1973, 4:155-169.
26. Tyler T.R. Why people obey the law 2006, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
27. Esaiasson P., Holmberg S. Representation from Above. Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden 1996, Aldershot, Dartmouth.
28. 2 tax. Clim. Policy 2006, 5:613-625.
29. Chayanov A.V. The theory of peasant economy. Il: Irwin Inc 1966, Homewood.
30. Hansla A., Gamble A., Juliusson A., Gärling T. The relationships between awareness of consequences, environmental concern, and value orientations. J. Environ. Psychol. 2008, 28:1-9.
31. Eriksson L., Garvill J., Nordlund A. Acceptability of travel demand management measures: the importance of problem awareness, personal norm, freedom, and fairness. J.Environ. Psychol. 2006, 26:15-26.
32. Eriksson L., Garvill J., Nordlund A. Interrupting habitual car use: the importance of car habit strength and moral motivation for personal car use reduction. Transp. Res. Part F 2008, 11:10-23.
33. Dietz T., Fitzgerald A., Shwom R. Environmental values. Annu. Rev. Environ.Nat. Resour. 2005, 30:335-372.
34. Steg L., Dreijerink L., Abrahamse W. Factors influencing the acceptability of energy policies: a test of VBN theory. J. Environ. Psych. 2005, 25:415-425.
35. Stern P.C. Toward a coherent theory of environmentally significant behaviour. J. Soc. Issues 2000, 56:407-424.
36. Kaplan I.M. Regulation and compliance in the New England conch fishery. Mar. Policy 1998, 22:327-335.
37. Torgler B. Tax morale, rule governed behaviour and trust. Constit. Polit. Economy 2003, 14:119-140.
38. 2-tax vis-à-vis alternative policy instruments. Environ. Politics 2009, 18:218-237.
39. Food Gezelius S. Money, and morals: compliance among natural resource harvesters. Hum. Ecol. 2004, 32:615-634.
40. Jentoft S., Mikalsen K.H. Lastet Til Ripa. Fiskernes Rettsstilling I Ressursforvaltningen 2001, Tapir forlag, Trondheim.
41. Johnsen J.P. The evolution of the "harvest machinery: why capture capacity has continued to expand in Norwegian fisheries. Mar. Policy 2005, 29:481-493.
42. Durkheim E. The Division of Labor in Society 1964, Free Press, New York.
43. Davis A., Bailey C. Common in custom, uncommon in advantage: common property, local elites and alternative approaches to fisheries management. Soc. Nat. Resour. 1996, 9:251-265.
44. Jentoft S. In the power of power: the understated aspect of fisheries management. Hum. Organiz. 2007, 66:426-437.