Why vote-seeking parties may make voters miserable

Irish Political Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 489-500

  Laver, Michael ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

agent based models; elections; party competition; representation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857568668     PISSN: 07907184     EISSN: 17439078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2011.619737     Document Type: Article

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