The Questionable Efficiency of the efficient-breach doctrine

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 168, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 5-26

  Lewinsohn Zamir, Daphna ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857551483     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245612799440014     Document Type: Article

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